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Abstract 
The report discusses our experiences of using two OASIS Web service standards; 
namely eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language which abbreviates to (XACML) 
and Security Assertion Mark-up Language or SAML as it is commonly known. Within 
the domain of the GOLD project we have combined these two standards to offer 
single login mechanisms, including a simple protocol for enabling the crossing of 
organizational boundaries. In addition we enable granular access control using the 
policy semantics defined by XACML.  
1.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this document is to discuss the work we have been doing with two 
OASIS-standards namely XACML and SAML, used for writing access control 
policies and carrying out access control and enabling authentication respectively. The 
report discusses usage of the standards as part of a demonstrator that was created for 
the GOLD project. The purpose of the report is to show how XACML and SAML can 
be used together to provide a flexible and at the same time powerful security 
mechanism. The report is structured as follows. We introduce the 2 standards and give 
some details as to what they do. Further on we introduce our demonstrator and the 
scenario we used. We provide a fair amount of detail regarding the XML messages 
and documents that are exchanged between the various entities of the demo while at 
the same time we explain the underlying protocols. We conclude the report with some 
further issues and future work. 
2.0 OASIS Standards 
In this section we introduce the 2 standards we used and some details as to how they 
are structured and what they can achieve. We have deliberately avoided to show XML 
in this section as we show XML messages as part of the Demo. 
2.1 XACML 
The first standard (XACML) is an XML based Web service standard for 
communicating access control policies between services. It provides standard XML 
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schema for expressing policies, rules based on those policies and conditions. It also 
specifies a request/response protocol for sending a request and having it approved. 
The request/response language expresses queries about whether a particular access 
should be allowed (requests) and describes answers to those queries (responses) [1]. 
Policies are defined in terms of subjects, (i.e. users, machines, services etc) and 
resources (documents, machines etc). Both subjects and resources are identified using 
URIs. The total number of subjects and resources together, define what XACML 
specification terms as the target space. 
 
The Specification defines a simple scenario which we quote in order to explain 
XACML. 
“In a typical XACML usage scenario, a subject (e.g. human user, workstation) wants 
to take some action on a particular resource. The subject submits its query to the 
entity protecting the resource (e.g. filesystem, web server).” [1] 
In the specification such an entity is called a PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). A PEP 
can be thought of as a piece of code that translates the request in the XML format that 
XACML specifies. 
“The PEP forms a request (using the XACML request language) based on the 
attributes of the subject, action, resource, and other relevant information. The PEP 
then sends this request to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), which examines the request, 
retrieves policies (written in the XACML policy language) that are applicable to this 
request, and determines whether access should be granted according to the XACML 
rules for evaluating policies.” [1] 
In the sunxacml API the PDP is piece of software that reads both requests in XML 
format (as standardised by XACML) and XACML policies, and formulates an XML 
response. Actually the entire API is about the PDP as the other architectural 
components such as the PEP are domain specific. 
“That answer (expressed in the XACML response language) is returned to the PEP, 
which can then allow or deny access to the requester.” [1] 
XACML does not make decisions; it merely gives a response according to the policy 
input it receives. The response is not forced. So additional programming is needed to 
actually read the response from the PDP (by parsing the xml) and force the policy. 
The benefits of the XACML as written in the specification are as follows. 
• “One standard access control policy language can replace dozens of application-
specific languages.” [1] 
•  “Good tools for writing and managing XACML policies will be developed, since 
they can be used with many applications.” [1] 
Personal experience with the standard can verify the first point as true and therefore 
very useful in a VO scenario such that addressed by GOLD. The second point needs 
to be researched more in order to write the tools that will successfully take advantage 
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of the full potential of the standard. A problem we encountered and potential for an 
XACML tool is described later in the document. 
2.2 SAML 
SAML stands for Security Assertions Markup Language and it is about security 
assertion within a trust domain and is a standard for exchanging security information 
about users. SAML assertions are based upon XML messages, and can transfer 
information about authentication acts performed by subjects, attribute of subjects and 
authorization decisions about whether subjects are permitted to access certain 
resources. It tells if a user should be authenticated and what resources the user should 
be authorized to access. The typical sample use case of SAML is SSO (Single Sign-
On) mechanism, which allows a user to be able to sign on only once at one access 
point among a group of trusted sites [2] [4]. 
 
To make SAML work, there are two basic parties involved in a simple scenario, 
which are named as Asserting Party (AP) and Relying Party (RP) [2].  
 
Asserting Party: This can also be treated as Identity Provider, or the source site, or the 
authority party in the trust domain, which does the assertion job to assert a user. 
 
Relying Party: This can also be treated as Source Provider, or the destination site, the 
party which relies on the information supplied to it by the Asserting Party. It uses the 
statements passed from the Asserting Party to make access control decision. The 
statements from AP may basically include three types: authentication statements, 
attribute statements and authorization statements.  
 
To transfer assertions from an Asserting Party to Relying Party, SAML 1.1 provides 
two browser-based profiles, for achieving SSO. They are Browser/Artifact Profile, 
and Browser/POST Profile [2] [3]. The latter will be demonstrated in the demo 
application.  
 
Browser/Artifact (“pull” operation, RP pulls from AP)  
1.   Request the Inter-site Transfer Service at AP (identity provider) [2] [3]. 
2.   Redirect to the Artifact Receiver Service (RP, resource provider, target service). 
o Artifact is a reference to an assertion that the AP is to provide upon the 
request 
o It is assumed that the user has already had a security context at the AP. 
3.   User requests the Artifact Receiver service at the RP, carrying the artifact. 
4.   Artifact Receiver requests the Artifact Resolution Service at AP. 
5.   Artifact Resolution responds with a SAML Assertion. 
6.   Respond to the user’s original request via redirection.  
 
Figure 1 provides a high level abstract of how Browser/Artifact profile works.  
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Figure 1. Browser/Artifact Profile 
 
• Browser/Post (“push” operation, AP pushes to RP) [2] [3] 
 
1. Request the Inter-Site Transfer Service. 
2. Respond with a SAML assertion. 
o The Inter-Site Transfer service returns a SAML assertion tells where the 
Assertion Consumer service is.  
o It is assumed that the user has already had a security context at the AP.  
3. User requests the Assertion Consumer Service at RP. 
4. Respond to the user’s original request. 
o The RP inspects the SAML response, creates a security context on the 
resource provider and redirects the user to the target resource.  
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Figure 2. Browser/Post Post 
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3.0 GOLD requirements 
GOLD project is tightly concerned with the full lifecycle involving management 
issues, i.e. dynamic formation, operation and termination of virtual organisations to 
explore sustainable and competitive market opportunities.  
 
Resource sharing is a major issue within the context of VO. However to achieve 
successful resource sharing, trust is an indispensable aspect. All the VO participants 
must be able to trust each other to maintain the relationships in order to perform 
successful co-operations. Due to the nature of high diversity and dynamicity of the 
VO, a standardised and logically centralised approach to regulate the trust and 
security issues in tackling the problems with mutual distrust between participants, is 
highly advocated. With such a standardisation, VO participants can securely 
communicate with each other while each individual still retains its autonomy.   
 
The main problems GOLD is facing and going to solve are as follows. 
 
• To allow participants of a VO to express how they want to protect their resources 
on a strict need-to-know basis. 
 
• Based on the policies specified by the resource owners, the GOLD service can 
grant or deny the permission (on behalf of the resource owners) to a subject 
intending to access a certain resource. 
 
• To use federated id mechanisms to access GOLD associated resources by using 
Single-Sign-On system.   
 
Therefore a single action of authentication can permit a subject, i.e. user to access 
all the resources as long as policy permits, within a trust domain where the subject 
has access permission, without the need to enter passwords for multiple times on 
multiple sites. Such a mechanism can also minimise the possible authentication 
errors, inconsistencies, and authentication system failure in the trust domain.  
4.0 Experiment Introduction 
In this section we introduce our demo in terms of its purpose, architecture, design and 
implementation details. 
4.1 Demo Details  
A demo is designed to provide a fundamental insight of solving the aforementioned 
problems via hand-on experiments with XACML and SAML. The demo is based on 
the assumption of the following VO scenario hypothesized in GOLD. There are 3 
GOLD VO participants named as Company A, Company B, Company C.  
4.1.1 Individual Login 
Individually, each participant is an autonomous party holding their own resource 
documents, e.g. Chemical Research Findings, Chemical Experiments, Chemical 
Analysis, etc.  
 
 5
Each participant provides its own login mechanism through which a user, i.e. a 
company in the VO who acts as a subject in this case, can sign on directly to its site to 
request the liked documents. For example, Company A (i.e. subject) wants to access a 
document held by Company B (i.e. resource), therefore Company A signs on directly 
on Company B.  
 
Company B has its own copy of username/password, i.e. authentication mechanism 
for Company A. Once Company A’s request is granted according to Company B’s 
own policies and authentication is verified according to Company B’s own password 
check, Company A is then fully allowed to view the documents belonging to 
Company B.  
 
The above scenario has its obvious limitation.  
 
• Every resource request placed by a subject would incur a completely new process 
of authentication/authorisation. 
 
• The policies specified on resources may change dynamically due to the nature of 
VO. Subject requests may change dynamically as well. Each such change needs a 
new authorisation process, which is repetitive and most importantly, of no 
standardisation.  
 
• It is also undesirable if a subject sends multiple requests to multiple resources 
targets, where each request needs going through the above repetitively.   
 
Inconsistencies and errors will surely occur in all the above described situations. The 
above case, i.e. being authorised and authenticated individually, has been used in 
comparison with the GOLD approach introduced later in the paper. This is where the 
GOLD service development comes in.   
4.1.2 GOLD Service 
GOLD service, the main component currently being developed, provides a logically 
centralised mechanism to coordinate all the authorisation/authentication tasks within 
an already established VO involving many VO participants. It performs as an 
intermediate party to offer a universal solution between VO participants, and 
facilitates the authorisation/authentication processes across the VO. 
 
The GOLD service centrally administers all the resource access policies assigned by 
all the VO participants in GOLD service’s own policy storage. This storage stores all 
the policy creations from resource owners, and forms a place where subject requests 
would be checked against. The policies in the storage are in XACML format.  
 
Also, the GOLD service is responsible for issuing the SAML assertion once a subject 
request has been granted, therefore the subject, e.g. Company A can visit the target 
resource site, e.g. Company B, by showing Company B that it has a SAML assertion 
issued by GOLD. Company B already recognises GOLD as one trusted assertion 
issuer, so it understands that Company A, a participant in the same VO, has already 
been authorised and authenticated, therefore there is no more access control process is 
needed and the resource documents can be safely presented to Company A.  
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4.1.3 Graphical Interaction   
In this demo, the following are main items being demonstrated in graphical ways that 
VO participants can interact with. Nevertheless, those components and protocols 
which are unnecessary to be seen by VO participants will be largely covered in the 
later chapters, i.e. Architecture, and Protocol.  
4.1.3.1 As a resource owner 
This is where a policy regarding protection of a certain resource is created. 
 
 
Figure 3 Policy Creations (Permit) 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the main elements are: 
 
o Resource 
o URL 
o Subject 
o Action 
o Permission(permit or deny) 
 
A resource owner has the full right to decide how it wants a certain resource to be 
protected. For example, Company B can specify that its “chemical analysis” 
document (Resource) at its address (URL) can be accessed (Permission) as read-only 
(Action) by all the members of developers (Subject). Once a policy has been created, 
the resource owner sends a “commit” action to store the policy into Policy Storage at 
GOLD service in XACML format. This XML file is unseen to any participants, 
however for the purpose of demonstration, “Show XML” option in Figure 3, is used 
to show the actual XACML policy which goes into the Policy Storage of GOLD 
service. Figure 4 shows the policy file which embeds all the essential elements, i.e. 
resource, subject, action, permission, etc. as highlighted.  
 
<Policy PolicyId="GeneratedPolicy"  
RuleCombiningAlgId=……> 
       <Description>…… </Description> 
       <Target> 
           <Subjects> 
               <Subject> 
            <SubjectMatch MatchId=……> 
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                   <AttributeValue DataType=……> 
            cp1.co.uk 
        </AttributeValue> 
                        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
         AttributeId=……  
                         DataType=……/> 
            </SubjectMatch> 
                </Subject> 
             </Subjects> 
             <Resources> 
                 <Resource> 
                     <ResourceMatch MatchId=……> 
                     <AttributeValue DataType=……> 
       http://cp2.co.uk/Chemical_Analysis
          </AttributeValue> 
     <ResourceAttributeDesignator  
     AttributeId=…… DataType=……/> 
                     </ResourceMatch> 
                 </Resource> 
             </Resources> 
             <Actions> 
                  <AnyAction/> 
             </Actions> 
        </Target> 
        <Rule RuleId="GOLDRule" Effect="Permit"> 
             <Target> 
               <Subjects> 
            <AnySubject/> 
               </Subjects> 
               <Resources> 
             <AnyResource/> 
               </Resources> 
               <Actions> 
                     <Action> 
                         <ActionMatch MatchId=……> 
            <AttributeValue DataType=……> 
                            Read 
              </AttributeValue> 
                         <ActionAttributeDesignator  
            AttributeId=…… DataType……/> 
                    </ActionMatch> 
              </Action> 
       </Actions> 
           </Target> 
           <Condition FunctionId=……> 
       <Apply FunctionId=……> 
              <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
      AttributeId="group"  
      DataType=……  
     Issuer="main@cp1.co.uk"/> 
       </Apply> 
      <AttributeValue DataType=……> 
Developers 
</AttributeValue> 
           </Condition> 
       </Rule> 
       <Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/> 
</Policy> 
 
Figure 4.  Sample XACML Policy file 
 
4.1.3.2 As a resource requester (subject) 
This is main portal to the GOLD, where GOLD has login username/password for each 
participant. The document request screen is then invoked after login, as shown in 
Figure 5. What a subject needs to specify are: 
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o Actor: who is requester?  
o Resource: what does the Actor want? 
o Action: how does the Actor want to access the resource? 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Document request and SAML creation 
 
 
4.1.3.3 As GOLD 
GOLD in this instance carried out 3 tasks. It converts the subject request into a 
standardised XACML format, which will be shown in the later chapter. Figure 14 will 
provide the details. It evaluates the request against XACML policy retrieved from 
Policy Storage. The XACML response will be shown in later chapter where Figure 15 
provides the details. Finally once the evaluation stage has been accomplished and if 
the access to resource is granted, some implicit processes which the participants will 
not see take place here (As mentioned earlier, this also will be covered in depth in the 
next chapters to analyse the underlying architecture). Once the subject chooses “Send 
SAML Assertion” option in Figure 5, a SAML assertion is issued by GOLD service to 
certify the request is approved and that the subject can carry the SAML assertion and 
go to access the target resource on the resource owner site. This is where the Single-
Sign-On takes place. With this assertion in hand, the subject can visit other VO 
participants without the need to sign on again.  However, if the resource owner of the 
document “Chemical Analysis” has placed a “deny” on the same 
subject/subject/action (Figure 6), then the access would not be allowed after the “Send 
SAML Assertion” is chosen (Figure 7).  
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Figure 6. Policy Creations (deny) 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Access denied 
4.2 Architecture 
The architecture upon which the demo is based is dissected by demonstrating three 
parties involved, i.e. the GOLD service (i.e. the Asserting party), 2 GOLD 
participants- Company A, Company B. As presumed above, Company A is the 
subject (i.e. user) and Company B is the resource owner (i.e. Relying Party).  
4.2.1 GOLD service 
As shown in Figure 8, the GOLD service being developed is acting as an assertion 
party where the party is responsible for both XACML and SAML related services. 
The main components being implemented are User Login, Policy Decision Point and 
Inter-Site Transfer service (the Assertion Provider service involved), Context 
Validator service, etc. These can be generally identified as XACML stage and SAML 
stages.  
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Figure 8. GOLD service components 
   
The component of User Login is the main one coordinating this stage with local 
policy storage PDP. It does the following in sequence: 
 
1. Take in Company A’s login details (1.0) 
2. Present to Company A all the resource availabilities (2.0) 
3. Allow Company A to send in resource request (3.0) 
4. Evaluate the Company A’s request against the PDP and make decisions. (4.0) 
5. Activate Inter-Site Transfer component once access is granted. (5.0) 
 
Inter-Site Transfer component is the key and an addressable component providing the 
functionality for SAML processing, encompassing the redirection process addressed 
later. This component offers an Assertion Provider Web service and a subject request 
control unit.   
  
1. Assertion Provider Web service (building SAML assertion using OpenSAML1.0.1 
API [6]) 
 
This service takes Company A’s login and request details as input and produces 
SAML assertion (Figure 8: 6.0, 7.0). The SAML assertion is mainly containing 
following elements. These are also denoted in the Figure 9 to Figure 11. Due to the 
limitation of space, the SAML Conditions and Authentication Statements are 
displayed separately.  
a. SAML NameIdentifier 
b. Authentication Method 
c. Authentication time 
d. SAML Conditions 
e. Confirmation Method 
f. SAML Subject 
g. SAML Statements 
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h. SAML Assertion 
i. SAML Attributes 
j. ……………. Etc.  
 
Note: OpenSAML 1.0.1 is a set of open source Java and C++ libraries that are fully 
consistent with the SAML 1.0 and 1.1 CR specifications [6]. The SAML building 
process normally starts from inside out, i.e. build the subject first (Figure 11), any 
conditions enforced (Figure 10), the statements (Figure11), and then finally the 
assertion (Figure 9). 
 
<Assertion 
xmlns=……  
xmlns:saml=……  
xmlns:samlp=…… 
xmlns:xsd=……  
xmlns:xsi=…… 
AssertionID=”_a3f14063925efb9e932842 
 437c1d327f” 
IssueInstant=”2005-04- 
14T13:34:19.794Z”  Issuer=www.goldservice.ac.uk
MajorVersion="1" 
MinorVersion="1"> 
 
…… Add SAML CONDITIONS 
 (Figure 10) 
  
……SAML AUTHENTICATION  
        STATEMENTS 
 (Figure 11) 
</Assertion> 
 
 
Figure 9.  SAML Assertion 
 
<Conditions 
 NotBefore=”2005-04-14T13:34:19.143Z” 
 NotOnOrAfter=”2005-04- 
14T13:39:19.143Z”> 
 
<AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
 <Audience>……</Audience> 
 
                 <Audience>……</Audience> 
                                 <Audience>……</Audience> 
</AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
</Conditions> 
 
 
Figure 10. SAML Conditions 
 
 
<AuthenticationStatement  
AuthenticationInstant=…… 
AuthenticationMethod=…… 
<Subject> 
       <NameIdentifier Format=                       
       http://www.customformat.com
       NameQualifier=  
      "http://www.goldproject.ac.uk"> 
       </NameIdentifier> 
 
      <SubjectConfirmation> 
              <ConfirmationMethod> 
  ……  
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              </ConfirmationMethod> 
      </SubjectConfirmation> 
</Subject> 
<SubjectLocality  
 IPAddress="128.240.125.37"> 
</SubjectLocality> 
</AuthenticationStatement> 
 
Figure 11. Authentication Statements 
 
2. A subject request control unit 
 
This is implemented by using a jsp page. It does the following: 
a. Call the Assertion Provider service to request a SAML assertion 
 
b. Activate the Assertion Consumer component on resource owner site (i.e. 
Relying Party, Company B) by passing the username, the assertion and the 
assertion issuer name (introduced in next paragraph). 
 
c. Once accepted by resource’s Assertion Consumer, redirect to a portal page on 
the target resource (Company B) (introduced in next paragraph). If not the P1 
fails to access the target resource.  
 
3.  Context Validator web service 
 
This component as shown in Figure 12, takes in a validation request from Assertion 
Consumer and returns true if Company A is a valid one identified at GOLD service. 
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Figure 12. Context Validator, Assertion Consumer (A continuation of Figure 8) 
 
4.2.2 VO participants (autonomous feature) 
As identified, each VO participant is an autonomous party having its own login 
system to activate its individual login process, i.e. it doesn’t need to go through 
GOLD Service. However GOLD provides a mechanism to facilitate the login 
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processes in the VO, which has already been discussed in the Chapter 4.1. Here the 
VO participant in particular refers to the resource owner, which consists of an 
Assertion Consumer unit, and an Authentication Decision unit.  
   
• Assertion Consumer  
 
This is the main component on Relying Party side, as shown above in Figure 12. The 
component returns Boolean true if the following requirements are fulfilled.  
o If the subject exists locally as a valid one 
o If the subject has a valid SAML assertion 
o If the SAML assertion issuer (i.e. GOLD service in the demo) is one of 
the trusted Asserting Parties 
o If validation request to GOLD service has a successful return 
 
• Authentication Decision unit  
 
This Authentication Decision unit is implemented by using a jsp page on the relying 
party side. Since a subject request can either come from direct login onto the resource, 
or come from a GOLD redirection, it does the following according to its conditional 
judgement.  
o If the request is directed from local assertion consumer as a result of 
GOLD redirection, go directly to get the target resource. 
o If the request is an individual login one without going through GOLD, 
then validates the user details against local copy of password details. If 
the validation proves to be successful, present the resource; if not, ask 
the user to try again. 
4.3 Protocols  
This section depicts the protocols involved with the interactions, data transfer between 
different components described in the earlier section. The protocols are the basics on 
which different components are connected.  These include the XACML 
request/response protocol, SAML request/response protocol, and Assertion 
validation/confirmation protocol.  
4.3.1 XACML request/response protocol 
This is related to the interaction between different parties in the XACML 
authorization stage. 
 
The main parties involved in this protocol are  
• Request Entry Point 
• Policy Storage Point 
• Policy Decision Point 
• Policy Enforcement Point 
 
The main data flows involved in this protocol are 
• Incoming request from subject, to the Request Entry Point 
• Converting to XACML request in XML form (sample shown in Figure 14) 
• Retrieval of XML policies from Policy Storage Point 
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• Decision making and sending XACML response to PEP (sample shown in Figure 
15) 
• PEP enforces decision on subject 
 
Figure 13 shows these main parties and data flows in this protocol.  
Request Entry
Point
Policy, 
Decision Point
Policy 
Enforcement 
Point
Policy, 
Storage Point P
P
Request
1.0
XACML 
Request
2.0
XML 
Policies
2.0
XACML 
Response
3.0
Decision
4.0
 
        Figure13.  XACML Request/Response Protocol 
  
 
 
<Request> 
       <Subject  subjectCategory=……> 
               <Attribute AttributeId=……  
    DataType=……> 
   <AttributeValue> 
   any@cp1.co.uk
   </AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute AttributeId="group" 
                                  DataType=…… 
                  Issuer="main@cp1.co.uk"> 
                 <AttributeValue> 
                 Developers 
                 </AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
       </Subject> 
      <Resource> 
<Attribute AttributeId=…… 
                  DataType=……> 
                  <AttributeValue> 
      http://cp2.co.uk/  
                                   Chemical_Analysis
                  </AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
     </Resource> 
     <Action> 
     <Attribute AttributeId=…… 
    DataType=……> 
                  <AttributeValue> 
                  Read 
                  </AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
     </Action> 
</Request> 
Figure14.  XACML Request 
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<Response> 
        <Result  
 ResourceID="http://cp2.co.uk/Chemical 
 _Analysis"> 
          <Decision>Permit</Decision> 
         <Status> 
        <StatusCode  
                Value="urn:oasis:names:tc: 
                xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
     </Status> 
         </Result> 
</Response> 
 
Figure 15. XACML Response 
 
4.3.2 SAML request/response protocol 
This is related to the interaction between a SAML assertion requester and a SAML 
assertion provider. A request is made by the subject and a response is returned by 
GOLD service.  A request in this demo is an authentication query, and is met with a 
common SAML response. The protocol being implemented in the demo is based on 
the Browser/Post profile as illustrated earlier.  
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Figure 16. SAML Request/ Response protocol, Assertion Validation/Confirmation 
 
The main parties involved in this protocol are 
• Subject Application Company A 
• Resource owner Company B 
• GOLD service (Inter-Site Transfer) 
 
The main data flows involved in this protocol are 
 
• SAML request via SOAP request  
• SAML response via SOAP response 
• Company A sending SAML assertion to the Company B.  
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Figure 16 shows these main parties and data flows in this protocol.  
 
4.3.3 Assertion validation/confirmation protocol and provision of 
resource  
This is related to the interaction between a resource owner and GOLD service.  
 
• Resource Owner Company B sends a validation request to the ContextValidator at 
GOLD Service(i.e. the Security Context on AP mentioned earlier) via SOAP 
request 
• ContextValidator at GOLD Service sends back a Confirmation response to 
Company B, via SOAP response. 
• Resource provision to Company A from Company B.  
 
Figure 16 shows the parties and data flows involved in this protocol.  
5.0 Future work 
Our future work involves further implementation of the standards to be included in 
the GOLD system as well as further research on verification of XACML policies and 
evaluation of our work against existing tools. 
5.1 Integration work with other parts of the project 
The main aim of the demo being currently developed is to investigate how the use of 
XACML/SAML standards can be integrated with the main GOLD framework. It will 
provide a standalone component for XACML policy based access control to be 
plugged into the main framework. It will achieve desirable flexibilities for the VO 
participants to easily create their own policies and deposit them in the GOLD policy 
storage. The single-sign-on mechanism with SAML needs to be updated in line with 
the GOLD requirements and be integrated into GOLD framework as a Web service 
component. The single-sign-on mechanism is also going to integrate with the 
implementation of WS-Security standards. This is to enable the SOAP messages to be 
digitally signed/verified or encrypted/decrypted. This is particularly useful when 
sending SAML request/response between a subject and GOLD assertion provider to 
ensure the Web service communication is secure. SAML assertion itself is one of the 
WS-Security tokens inserted into SOAP message.  
5.2 Evaluation on the existing tools 
As a good insight and good understandings have been obtained in using these 
standards, evaluation of some existing systems is worthwhile. This is to make sure the 
work being undertaken is not unnecessarily overlapping with some existing tools (e.g. 
shibboleth [7], Permis [8], OASIS [9], SourceID [10], etc) which might deal with 
similar problems. There is no point to re-invent the wheel, if any existing tool can be 
used in our GOLD framework to meet the requirements.  
5.3 Adding extra layer to check consistencies to avoid run-
time crash  
Ideally it will be more desirable to have a layer between the Policy Entry Point and 
the Policy Storage where policies are verified against possible inconsistencies. The 
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Policy Decision Point should not be invoked without guarantees that the policies are 
correct. This has been a current problem found with the use of sunxacml API.  
6.0 Conclusions 
This document has identified two important standards, XACML, SAML, which 
GOLD is adopting to manage the access control issues in a virtual organization. To 
suit the nature of virtual organization, and the requirements of GOLD, the problems 
residing in VO can be summarized into:  Diversity and Dynamicity of Policy; Multiple 
authorization mechanism, Multiple authentication processes.  
 
GOLD is looking into providing centralized and administrative mechanisms, where 
the above problems can be solved with a logically central and standardized approach. 
Therefore, the standards being investigated have meant to regulate the relevant 
aspects in the VO, to allow all the VO participants to speak in the same languages 
while communicating with each other without any inconsistencies occurring, and to 
cope with the dynamic change in the VO.  
 
XACML is an XML standard for access control and describes both an access policy 
language and a request/response language. SAML is an XML standard for exchanging 
authentication and authorization data in the security domain, and the single most 
important problem that SAML is trying to solve is the Single Sign-On (SSO) 
problem.  
 
The demo system being developed is giving hand-on experiences to demonstrate that 
these two OASIS standards can be actually implemented in a practical way to get 
incorporated with the other parts of the GOLD system.  The demo development is still 
at a prototype building stage; nevertheless it underpins the essential understandings on 
how these standards work. The demo has been elucidated with a general introduction 
on the scenario assumed, followed by a detailed investigation into the underlying 
architecture and protocol issues. Future work has been planned and will be underway 
once the current prototype is more robust.  
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